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Agenda for Security Team Meeting
--------------------------------

Workflow
========

- Opening up the security process further to allow maintainers of packages with
  frequent issues to release updates themselves
  - Updates need to be reviewed/acked by sec team members

  - Requires changes to dak to no longer require access to security-master,
    e.g.  by using a mechanism similar to allowing a DM to upload and sending
    error messages to the signer of the upload (already requested by Thijs)

  - Requires changes to debian-security-announce

- Is dsa-needed an improvement? What shall we do with embargoed issues?

- Ditch RT?

- Draft new people, possible candidates

- Drop "Problem type" and "Vulnerability" from DSAs? Mostly
  duplicating information from vulnerability databases

Archive tools
=============

- Compile a list of issues we want to see fixed

- Do we really need the embargo queue? This would simplify dak/FTP situations immensely.

  - Or rather, do we need an unembargoed queue? we still have different
    UNIX groups and nowadays all uploads end up in the embargoed queue

- Make it simple to release packages for others to test, e.g. an aptable security queue

Tracker
=======

- Add a new status to differentiate between "no-dsa, if the maintainer wants
  to fix in a point update go ahead" and "no-dsa, was ignored because it's
  possible to backport".

- Automatic weekly status on open issues sent to maintainers (catches
  issues which fell through the cracks, like CVE-2013-2236)

- Check open bugs in the BTS, check bugs against security-tracker pseudo package

- Support for consistency checks on source package names, e.g linux-2.6/linux
  or all of the ruby packages

- Version consistency checks, like an issue being marked as fixed in x.z and
  not affecting stable, yet stable has x.y.

- Keeping information about older, archived, releases? related to the above
  point about consistency checks on source package names: should be possible
  to say a package was renamed from foo to bar.

- Automating more tasks:
  + dropping "NOTE: to be rejected" when an issue is marked as REJECTED
  + script to atumatically merge data/next-{oldstable-,}point-update.txt
  + get an overview of newly reported bugs in the Debian BTS which have
    tag security (if one submits a bug not over reportbug we do not get
    a copy)?

Infrastructure
==============

- Availability in general. sec-master going down, alioth going down
  (again), what are the implications and what can be done about it.

- Migrate to git?

Documentation
=============

- Work on proper documentation how people can contribute

- Remove mentions of the "testing security team" since that doesn't
  seem to exist anymore?

Others
======

- d-d-a mail for file collecting willing testers for exotic setups

- Compile a list of test instructions for key packages

- Compile a list of problemtic packages in jessie for the release team

  + What to do with OpenJDK? best-effort + dropping icedtea-web?
    Ubuntu is also questioning the support:
    https://lists.ubuntu.com/archives/ubuntu-devel/2014-January/037991.html

Distribution hardening
======================

- hardening build flags:

  - release goal status

  - PIC/PIE situation

  - adding new flags to dpkg-buildflags? (-fstack-protector-strong, others?)

  - planning for release goal speedup? [corsac: what does it means?]

  - hidepid by default

  - heap protection experiment for some packages? (e.g. mcheck)

- mount flags and default partitioning

- default open ports

- kernel hardening: memory protections (heap/stack/...), reducing the attack surface

- Require fs.protected_symlinks? (enabled by default in Wheezy, kfreebsd doesn't support it)

- Disabling rare codecs/stuff by default.

LTS
===

- Setup and organisation

- Gather a specific list of people interested in contributing (e.g. credative already stepped forward)

.. vim: filetype=rst:

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